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1. Introduction
Myerson (1981), building on the work of Vickrey (1961) and Harsanyi (1967/68),
studied auctions as noncooperative games with incomplete information. Viewing the
auction problem in this way, Myerson reduced the seller's problem to one of designing a
revelation game, to be played by the potential buyers, having an equilibrium that maximized
the seller's expected payoff. In his model, Myerson assumed that buyers and the seller
were risk neutral and that the private information of buyers was independently distributed.
In this paper, we develop a general auction model in which buyers and seller are risk averse
and private information is multidimensional and correlated, and in this setting we examine
the problem of optimal auction design. In particular, we consider the problem faced by
someone who has an object to sell but who does not know how much prospective buyers
might be willing to pay, and allowing for risk aversion and correlated information on the
part of buyers, we demonstrate the existence of an auction procedure that yields the risk
averse seller the highest expected utility among all the auction procedures that are rational
and Bayesian incentive compatible.
Auctions in which the seller and the buyers are risk neutral and private information
is independently distributed have been intensely studied in the literature (in addition to
Myerson (1981), see for example Riley and Samuelson (1991) and Harris and Raviv
(1981)). Two main conclusions emerge from this work. First, the four most common
forms of auctions (Dutch, first-price, second-price, and English)1 generate the same
expected revenue for the seller. Second, for many common distributions of private
information (including the normal, exponential, and uniform distributions) the four
standard auction forms with suitably chosen reserve prices or entry fees are optimal from
the perspective of the seller. These conclusions, however, are not robust with respect to
changes in the assumption that the seller or the buyers are risk neutral or with respect to a
change in the assumption that private information is independently distributed. For
example, Maskin and Riley (1984) show that if the private information of buyers is
independently distributed but buyers are risk averse, then from the seller's viewpoint first-
price and English auctions are not revenue equivalent - nor are they optimal. Alternatively,
Milgrom and Weber (1982) show that if buyers and the seller are risk neutral but private
information is dependent - and in particular affiliated - then English auctions generate the
1The Dutch auction is conducted by an auctioneer who initially calls for a high price and then continuously
lowers the price until some buyer stops the auction and claims the object at that price. In an English
auction, the auctioneer begins by soliciting bids at a low price and then gradually raises the price until only
one willing buyer remains. A first-price auction is a sealed-bid auction in which the buyer making the
highest bid wins and pays the amount of his bid for the object. A second-price auction is also a sealed-bid
auction in which the buyer making the highest bid wins and pays the amount of the second highest bid.2
highest expected revenue to the seller, followed by the second-price auction, and finally the
Dutch and first-price auctions. These studies indicate the importance of analyzing auction
environments in which both risk aversion and correlated private information are present.
While such auction environments are common in practice, they have not been examined in
the existing literature. They are, however, the focus of this paper.
We formulate the seller's problem as one of designing a revelation game, to be
played by risk-averse buyers, having an equilibrium that maximizes the risk-averse seller's
expected utility.2 As in Myerson (1981) each buyer's private information is represented by
his type, and the seller's incomplete information problem arises due to his lack of
knowledge concerning each buyer's type. The auction model we develop covers as special
cases many of the auction environments analyzed in the existing literature - including the
Milgrom-Weber (1982) model with affiliated private information and the Maskin-Riley
(1984) model with risk-averse buyers. In contrast to much of the existing literature, our
auction model allows multidimensional buyer type descriptions (i.e., each buyers private
information is allowed to be multi-dimensional) and vector-valued payoffs. Thus, our
model as well as our results can be applied to multidimensional bidding situations in which
the participants are risk averse and information is correlated. These types of auctions are
common in government procurement contracting (e.g., a defense contractor may bid on
price and quality in the production of a weapons system - see Che (1993) and Johnson
(1994)). Moreover, in our model we assume that each buyer's utility depends not only
upon his own type (i.e., private information) but also upon the types of the other buyers.
Thus, our model allows for informational externalities. Finally, in addition to assuming that
auction payoffs are vector-valued, we assume that each buyer's utility depends not only
upon his own auction payoff but upon the payoffs of others. Thus, our model allows for
payoff externalities.
For the seller, the problem of game design reduces to one of mechanism choice. In
particular, given the seller's probability beliefs concerning buyer types, the seller's problem
is to choose a function, defined on the set of buyer types taking values in the set of
probability measures defined over winner-payoff vector pairs, that maximizes the seller's
expected utility. In choosing this function, or mechanism, the seller faces two constraints:
(1) the mechanism must be such that no buyer has an incentive to report his type
dishonestly (i.e., the mechanism must be Bayesian incentive compatible or BIC)3, and (2)
the mechanism must be such that each buyer has an incentive to participate in the auction in
2Thus, the auction problem can be viewed as a Stackelberg game in which the seller moves first, designing
a revelation game to be played by the potential buyers who act as the followers.
3Here we follow Myerson (1981) in assuming that unless a buyer is given an incentive to misreport his
type, he will report honestly. In a one-shot game such as an auction, this assumption is sensible.3
the first place (i.e., the mechanism must be individually rational for each buyer). Besides
being rational and BIC, the only other requirement we impose is that the mechanism be
measurable. Thus, in our model the selection of an auction mechanism is governed by
economic considerations rather than exogenous technical restrictions such as continuity and
differentiability.
Because the existence problem is infinite dimensional, novel existence arguments
are required. We base our resolution of the existence problem upon the notion of K-
convergence almost everywhere and a result due to Balder (1990) on sequential
compactness (with respect to K-convergence) in spaces of transition probabilities.
Essentially, K-compactness provides a subsequence extraction principle that is analytically
similar to sequential compactness for the topology of pointwise convergence. Given the
pointwise nature (i.e., the type-dependent nature) of the rationality and Bayesian incentive
compatibility constraints, this subsequence principle is precisely what is needed in order to
begin to establish the existence of an optimal BIC auction mechanism. K-compactness,
however, takes us only part of the way there. In order to finally establish existence, we
must show that the set of rational, BIC auction mechanisms is K-closed. In particular, we
must show that any equivalence class of auction mechanisms determined by the K-limit of a
K-convergent sequence of rational, BIC auction mechanisms contains at least one rational,
BIC auction mechanism.4 In general, not all the mechanisms contained in the equivalence
class determined by the K-limit of a K-convergent sequence of rational, BIC auction
mechanisms are BIC. Moreover, in an auction model where private information is
correlated and several buyers hold heterogeneous probability beliefs conditioned on private
information, showing that such an equivalence class contains a BIC mechanism is a delicate
matter. Here, we accomplish this by simply going through the task of constructing a BIC
mechanism contained in such an equivalence class.
In previous work by the author (e.g., Page (1989, 1994)) the problem of existence
of optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanisms has been analyzed
in various principal-agent settings with adverse selection and moral hazard. Besides
fundamental differences in the settings (i.e., the auction setting versus the principal-agent
setting), there are also fundamental differences in the nature of the existence problems that
arise in analyzing DSIC mechanisms versus BIC mechanisms - most notably with regard to
the nature and resolution of the K-closure problem. As in the BIC case, in order to
establish the existence of an optimal DSIC mechanism it must be shown that any
equivalence class of mechanisms determined by the K-limit of a K-convergent sequence of
rational, DSIC mechanisms contains at least one rational, DSIC mechanism. However, in
4Equivalence classes are identified with respect to a particular dominating measure.4
the case of DSIC mechanisms this can be accomplished via a relatively straightforward
application of measurable selection techniques. These techniques, however, cannot be used
in the BIC case to resolve the K-closure problem.
The analysis here also continues an analysis of BIC mechanisms begun in Page
(1992). There, Stackelberg games with incomplete information are considered in which
each follower's payoff depends only upon his own type, his own action, and the leader's
action (i.e., values are private and there is moral hazard as well as adverse selection).
Besides focusing on the auction problem (i.e., a screening problem with adverse selection
only), here we examine a screening problem with informational externalities: each buyer's
payoff depends not only on his own type but on the types of the other buyers.
In Section 2, we present the basic ingredients of the auction model. In Section 3,
we define what is meant by an auction mechanism, we define K-compactness, and we
present our basic results on K-compactness in the set of auction mechanisms. In section 4,
we define what is meant by a rational, BIC auction mechanism for an auction model with




[A-1]: We will assume that the basic elements of the auction are known to the seller as well
as the buyers.
[A-2]:
I = {0,1,2, . . . , h}. The elements of I, denoted by i or j, will index the players
in the auction, with 0 denoting the seller and i  = 1,2, . . . h, denoting the 
buyers. Equip I with the metric r, defined as follows:
r(i, i') = 1 if ii ¹ ' . (I, r) is a compact metric space.
X = a compact subset of Rh with elements denoted by xx x x h = ( , ,..., ) 12 . Each
x is a vector of payments. If xi > 0, then the seller makes a payment of xi to
the ith buyer, and if xi < 0 then the ith buyer makes a payment of xi to the 
seller.
Ti = the set of ith buyer types with elements denoted by ti, equipped with the 
s-field Si.
T = TT T h 12 ´ ´×××´ , with elements denoted by tt t t h = ( , ,..., ) 12 , equipped 
with the product s-field    SS S S =´´ ´ 12 L h .
T i - = TT i T i T h 11 1 ´×××´ - ´ + ´×××´ , with elements denoted by
t i tt i t i t h - = -+ ( ,..., , ,..., ) 11 1, equipped with the product s-field
S-i = SS S S 11 1 ´×××´ - ´ + ´×××´ ii h .
(, ) t i ti - = ( ,..., , , ,..., ) tt i t i t i t h 111 -+  = t.
pi = for i = 0,1,2, . . . ,h, a probability measure defined on (,) T S representing 
the ith player's prior probability beliefs concerning buyer types.
2.2 Conditional Probability Beliefs
[A-3]: (1) For i = 1,2, . . . ,h, we will assume that qi(|) ×× is a version of the regular 
conditional probability of pi with respect to the marginal mi of pi defined on
(, ) T ii S .
Thus, under [A-3] (1), for each E i qi E Î - × S ,( | )  is a real-valued, Si-measurable function
defined on Ti specifying for each of the ith buyer's types, the probability weight the ith
buyer assigns to the subset E, and for any S i ÎS ,  pi SE q i Et i S
m idti () ( | ) ( ) ´= ò . If the
sets, Ti, are Borel spaces and the s-fields, Si, Borel s-fields, then by Dellacherie and6
Meyer (1975, III, pp. 69-73), for each probability measure pi defined on T, there exists
regular conditional probabilities.
We will also assume that there is a product measure    mm m =´ ´ 1 L h  defined on
(T,S), with each mi s-finite on Si, such that
[A-3]: (2) the ith buyer's probability measure pi defined on the set T of buyer types is 
absolutely continuous with respect to m (denoted pi << m), and
(3) for each i and ti T Î , the ith buyer's conditional probability measure 
qi ti (| ) ×  defined on the set T i -  of other buyer types is absolutely 
continuous with respect to m-i (denoted qi ti (| ) × <<m-i), where m-i is 
the product measure    mm m m 11 1 ´´- ´+ ´´ LL ii h .
We will refer to m as the dominating measure.
Remarks 1
(1) [A-3] is satisfied in any auction model in which each participant's probability
distribution over types has a density function (i.e., Lebesgue measure serves as the
dominating measure). Thus, in most auction models in the literature [A-3] is satisfied (see
for example Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981), Milgrom and Weber (1982),
Maskin and Riley (1984), and Che (1993)).
(2) In the analysis to follow, we will use the dominating measure m to define
equivalence classes of auction mechanisms and to identify and keep track of the relevant
sets of measure zero. Given that buyers hold heterogeneous probability beliefs conditioned
on private information, it would be a difficult task to keep track of the sets of measure zero
without such a dominating measure. We will also use m to construct a method of detecting
dishonest reporting by buyers (this is done in the proof of Theorem 5.1). In order to see
that [A-3] is a mild assumption, consider the following example:
Example
The following example satisfies all the conditions given in [A-3]. Suppose there are two
buyers, i = 1,2, such that for each i, Ti = [0,¥), so that T =¥ ´¥ [, ) [, ) 00 , and let S be
the Borel product s-field, BB [, ) [, ) 00 ¥´ ¥, in T. Equip (T,S) with the Lebesgue product
measure mm m =´ 12 . Suppose now that the ith buyer's probability beliefs are given via a
joint density function hi() ×, defined on T, so that for any E ÎS,7
pi Eh i E
td t () ( )() = ò m .
Thus, pi <<m. Now let ri ti (| ) ×  denote the conditional density corresponding to the joint
density hi() ×, so that for any S i Î - S ,
qi St i r i S
tit ii dt i (| ) ( | ) ( ) = -- - ò m .
Thus, qi ti (| ) × <<m-i for all ti Ti Î .
2.3 Payoffs
vi(,,) ××× = for i = 1,2,...,h, the ith buyer's  real-valued payoff function defined on 
TIX ´´ . Thus, vi tjx (,, )  is the payoff to the ith buyer if player
j = 0,1,2,...,h wins the auction and the type and payment h-tuples are t and
x respectively. We will assume that vi t (,,) ×× is continuous on IX ´ for 
each tT Î , that vi jx (,, ) ×  is S-measurable on T for each (, ) jx I X Î´ , and
that vi(,,) ××× is pi- integrably bounded on TIX ´´  (i.e., 
|( , , ) | ( ) v i tjx it £x  on TIX ´´ , where xi() × is a pi - integrable function 
on T).
u( , , ) ××× = the seller's real-valued payoff function defined on TIX ´´ . Thus, 
utjx (,, )  is the payoff to the seller if player j = 0,1,2,...,h wins the auction 
and the type and payment h-tuples are t and x respectively. We will assume 
that ut (,,) ×× is upper-semicontinuous on IX ´ for each tT Î , that u( , , ) ××× 
is S´ ´ BI X () - measurable on TIX ´´ , and that u( , , ) ××× is p0-
integrably bounded from above on TIX ´´  (i.e., utjx t (,, ) () £z  on 
TIX ´´ , where z() × is a p0- integrable function on T ). Here BI X () ´  
denotes the Borel s-field in IX ´.
Note that if j = 0 "wins" (i.e., if the seller wins), then the seller keeps the object
(i.e., the object is not sold).
3. Auction Mechanisms and K-compactness
Let PI X () ´  denote the set of all probability measures defined on the Borel s-field
BI X () ´  in IX ´, and equip PI X () ´  with the topology of weak convergence of
probability measures. Since IX ´ is a compact metric space, PI X () ´  is compact and
metrizable for the topology of weak convergence of measures (Parthasarathy (1967),8
Theorem 6.4). Elements of PI X () ´  will be denoted by j's, and we will write jj n Þ
whenever the sequence {} ( ) j nn PI X Ì´  converges weakly to jÎ ´ PI X () .
We shall restrict attention to direct auction mechanisms. In a direct mechanism, the
buyers simultaneously and confidentially make reports to the seller concerning their types
and the seller then selects a winner and a vector of payments based on these reports (recall
that if xi > 0, then the seller makes a payment to the ith buyer; and if xi < 0 then the ith
buyer makes a payment to the seller). Thus, a direct mechanism is a function,
j() : ( ) ×®´ TP I X  defined as follows: if tt t t h = ( , ,..., ) 12  is the h-tuple of reported types,
then the winner-payment pair, (, ) ix I X Î´ , is selected according to the probability
measure j() ( ) tP I X Î´. By the Revelation Principle, we can restrict attention to direct
mechanisms without loss of generality, as long as the mechanisms are incentive compatible
(i.e., induce truthful reporting).
Now let BPI X (( ) ) ´  denote the Borel s-field in PI X () ´  generated by the
(metrizable) topology of weak convergence. A function j() : ( ) ×®´ TP I X  is said to be
measurable if for any subset of probability measures EB P IX Î´ (( ) )  
jj - =Î ÎÎ 1 () { :( ) } Et T t E S .
Let MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  denote the set of all measurable functions defined on T taking values in
PI X () ´ . We shall assume throughout that the feasible set of auction mechanisms is given
by  MTPI X (,( ) ) ´ . Elements of MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  will be denoted by j(|) ×× and by j() ×
(i.e.,  j(( ,) |) djx t is the element in PI X () ´  selected by the auction mechanism given
reports t).
The notion of compactness we shall use in analyzing the seller's auction design
problem is based on the notion of K-convergence almost everywhere.
3.1 Definition (K-convergence):
A sequence of mechanisms { ( )} ( , ( )) jnn MTPI X ×Ì ´ is said to K-converge [m] to a K-
limit j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X , if for each subsequence, {( ) } j n kk × , there is a m-null set










×+ + × 1 L
,
jj k tt () () Þ  for all tTN Î\.
Thus,  {( ) } j nn ×  K-converges a.e.[m] to K-limit j() ×, if for each subsequence,
{( ) } j n kk × , there is a set of h-tuples of buyer types N ÎS of m-measure zero such that for9
every tTN Î\, the sequence of probability measures, {( ) } ( ) j k t kPI X Ì´ , converges
weakly to j() ( ) tP I X Î´. Thus, for each tTN Î\,
l i m (, ) ( (, )| ) (, ) ( (, )| ) k gjx kdjx t gjx djx t
IX IX
jj =
´ ´ ò ò ,
for each real-valued continuous function g defined on the compact metric space IX ´.
3.2 Definition (K-compactness):
A subset Y of MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is said to be relatively K-compact [m] if every sequence in Y
contains a subsequence K-converging [m] to some j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X . Y is said to be
K-compact [m] if every sequence in Y contains a subsequence K-converging to some
j() ×Î   Y .
The feasible set of auction mechanisms, MTPI X (,( ) ) ´ , can be viewed as a set of
transition probabilities. In Balder (1990), the classical notion of tightness of probability
measures (e.g., see Parthasarathy (1967)) has been generalized to cover the case of
transition probabilities. This generalized notion of tightness is important for our purposes
because it guarantees the K-compactness of the feasible set of auction mechanisms. For the
moment assume that IX ´ is a complete, separable metric space (rather than a compact
metric space as we have assumed here).
3.3 Definition (m-tightness):
A subset Y of MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is said to be m-tight if there exists a function
hT I X :[ , ] ´´® + ¥ 0   such that
(i) h( , , ) ××× is S´ ´ BI X () -measurable,
(ii) ht (,,) ×× is inf-compact on IX ´ for each t (i.e., {( , ) : ( , , ) } jx I Xhtjx Î´ £ g 
is compact for each tT Î  and gÎ R ), and
(iii) sup (|) ( , ,)(( ,) |)( ) j jm ××Î ´
<+ ¥ ò ò Y htjx djx t d t
IX T
.
The importance of m-tightness is made clear by the following Theorem due to
Balder (1990).5 This result represents an extension of Komlos' Theorem (1967) to the
function space MTPI X (,( ) ) ´ .
5 In Balder (1990) a more general version of this result is given.10
3.4 Theorem:
Let Y be a subset of MTPI X (,( ) ) ´ . Then the following are equivalent:
(i) Y is m-tight.
(ii) Y is K-compact [m].
Observe that since IX ´ is a compact metric space, any subset of auction
mechanisms, YÌ ´ MTPI X (,( ) ) , is automatically m-tight (consider h( , , ) ××× identically
equal to zero). This observation leads immediately to the following:
3.5 Corollary: For IX ´ a compact metric space and (,,) T Sm a s-finite measure space,
any subset of MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is relatively K-compact [m], and MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is K-
compact [m].
4. Rational and Bayesian Incentive Compatible Auction Mechanisms
For each jÎ ´ PI X () , let
Vi tv i tjx djx
IX
(, ) (,, ) ( (, ) ) jj =
´ ò . 
It follows from the continuity of vi t (, , ) ×× on IX ´ for each tT Î  that Vi t (, ) ×  is
continuous on PI X () ´  (with respect to the topology of weak convergence) for each t.
Moreover, since vi jx (,,) ×  is S-measurable on T for each (, ) jx I X Î´ ,  Vi(,) ×j is S-
measurable on T for each jÎ ´ PI X () . Thus, Vi(,) ×× is S´ ´ BPI X (( ) ) -measurable on
TP IX ´´ ()  (Castaing and Valadier (1977), III.14), and thus, for any auction mechanism
j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X ,  Vi tt (, () ) j  is S-measurable.
Under the mechanism j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X , if the h-tuple of reported types is
tt t t h = ( , ,..., ) 12 , then the winner-payment pair (j,x) is selected according to the probability
measure  j() ( ) tP I X Î´. In designing the auction mechanism, the seller faces two
constraints: (1) the mechanism must be such that no buyer is given incentives to report his
type dishonestly (i.e., the mechanism must be Bayesian incentive compatible or BIC), and
(2) the mechanism must provide incentives for each buyer to participate in the auction in the
first place (i.e., the mechanism must be individually rational for each buyer). Formally,
these constraints can be stated as follows:11
j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X  is rational and BIC if and only if for each i = 1,2,...,h,
vi ti t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò v i t i t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j , (1)
for all ti Ti Ci Î \  and all  ¢ Î ti Ti, where Cii ÎS  and mi Ci () = 0 ; and
vi ti t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ³ ò ò j 0 , (2)
for all ti Ti Qi Î \ , where Qii ÎS  and mi Qi () = 0 .
Let B denote the subset of auction mechanisms in MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  satisfying the
BIC constraints (constraints (1)), and let G denote the subset of mechanisms satisfying the
individual rationality constraints (constraints (2)). Thus, BÇG denotes the set of rational
BIC auction mechanisms in MTPI X (,( ) ) ´ .
We shall assume that,
[A-4]: the  set  BÇG of all individually rational and Bayesian incentive compatible 
mechanisms is nonempty.
We shall also assume that
[A-5]: the  set  PI X () ´  contains a probability measure  ¢ j  such that
for each buyer i = 1,2,...,h,
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x q i t i t i ( , , , ) ( ( , )) ( | ) - ´ -
¢ - £ ò ò j 0 for all ti Ti Î .
Remarks 2
(1) [A-4] is nontriviality assumption: without [A-4] the auction design problem is
uninteresting. [A-4] will be satisfied if, for example, the set XR h Ì  of potential auction
payoffs contains a vector  ¢¢ x  such that for each buyer i = 1,2,...,h,12
vi tjx (,, ) ¢¢ ³ 0 for all (,) tj T I Î´ .
To see that this implies that BÇG is nonempty let  ¢¢Î´ jPI X ()  be a probability measure
such that  ¢¢ ´ ¢¢ = j ({ } ) Ix 1  and consider the auction mechanism that selects the probability
measure  ¢¢ j  for all h-tuples, t, of reported types. Such a mechanism is individually rational
and Bayesian incentive compatible for each buyer. One candidate for the vector  ¢¢ x  is the
zero vector. Note that if X does not contain the zero vector, then the zero vector can be
attached to X, via union, without destroying the compactness of X, the upper
semicontinuity of ut (,,) ××, or the continuity of vi t (,,) ×× for    ih = 12 ,, , K  and tT Î .
(2) [A-5] guarantees that the seller has available a "penalty" mechanism. [A-5] will be
satisfied if, for example, the set XR h Ì  of potential auction payoffs contains a vector  ¢ x
such that for each buyer i = 1,2,...,h,
vi tjx (,, ) ¢ £0  for all (,) tj T I Î´ .
Given the "penalty" vector  ¢ x , any probability measure  ¢Î´ j PI X ()  such that
¢ ´ ¢ = j ({ } ) Ix 1  satisfies [A-5]. Some possible candidates for "penalty" vectors are vectors
with large negative components (i.e., payoff vectors that call for each buyer to make a large
payments to the seller). Note that if X does not contain such a penalty vector, then such a
penalty vector can be attached to X (via union) without destroying the compactness of X,
the upper semicontinuity of ut (,,) ××, or the continuity of vi jx (,, ) ×  for    ih = 12 ,, , K  and
tT Î .
5. Main Results
5.1 Theorem (On the K-compactness of the set of rational, BIC auction mechanisms):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-5] hold. BÇG is nonempty, convex, and K-compact.
5.2 Corollary (On the K-closure of the set of rational, BIC auction mechanisms):
The  m-equivalence class of auction mechanisms determined by a K-limit,
ˆ() (,( ) ) j×Î ´ MTPI X , of a K-convergent sequence of rational, BIC auction mechanisms
contains at least one rational, BIC auction mechanism.13
5.3 Theorem (On existence):
Suppose [A-1]-[A-5] hold. The seller's auction design problem
max (|) ( , ,)(( ,) |) ( ) j j ××ÎÇ ´ ò ò B utjx djx tp
IX T




From [A-4] we have that BÇG is nonempty. Convexity follows from the affinity
of Vi t (, ) ×  on PI X () ´  for each i and t.
Consider a sequence of mechanisms {( ) } j nn B ×Ì Ç G . Since MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is
K-compact [m], we can assume without loss of generality that {( ) } j nn ×  K-converges to a
K-limit  ˆ() (,( ) ) j×Î ´ MTPI X . Thus, for some m-null set N ÎS,  jj n tt () ˆ () Þ  for all









×+ + × 1 L
.
Let
Nt i t i Ti t it i N (){ : (, ) } =-Î-- Î . (4)
For each i, we have (see Ash (1972), section 2.6)
mmm () (() ) ( ) N i T i
Nt ii dti = - = ò 0, (5)
so that for some Nii ÎS  with mi Ni () = 0 ,
m - = i Nt i ( ( )) 0 for all ti Ti Ni Î \ . (6)
Since for each i, mm m i N ii T i N i T i () ( ) ( ) × -- =´ - = 0  and pii i << = ´ - mm m,
p i N iT i () ´ - = 0 , for each i = 0,1,2,...,h.
Now define14
ht
if for some i i Nt i
otherwise
()
,( ( ) ) ,
,







and consider the auction mechanism
jj j () ˆ ()( () ) () t t ht ht =× - + ¢ × 1 , (8)
where  ¢ Î´ j PI X ()  is the "penalty" measure given in [A-5]. Since tii Nt i ® - m (() )  is
Si-measurable, h( ) ×  is S-measurable, and thus j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X . Note that since
jj () ˆ () tt =  for all tT i N iT i ÎÈ ´ - \( ), where the sets Ni are those given via (5) and (6),
and since  m() È´ - = i N i T i 0 ,  j() × and  ˆ() j× are in the same m-equivalence class. Thus,
j() × is also a K-limit (with respect to the dominating measure m) of the sequence
{( ) } j nn × . Note also that since pi << m for each i = 0,1,2,...,h, j() × and  ˆ() j× are in the
same pi-equivalence class for each i.
Let Cin Qin i ÈÎ S  denote the subset of ith buyer types (i = 1,2,...,h) such that
pi Cin Qin T i (( ) ) È´ - = 0  and such that for ith buyer types ti Cin Qin ÎÈ rationality
and/or incentive compatibility may fail to hold under the mechanism jn() × (see (1) and
(2)), and let
Fin C in Qin Ni ¥ =È È È [( ) ] , (9)
where the sets Ni are given via (5) and (6). Since pi Fi T i () ¥ ´ - = 0 ,
p ii F i T i (( ) ) È ¥ ´ -= 0 .
For each i and ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \ , we have the following observations:
(a) jj (, ) ˆ (, ) t i ti t i ti - = - for all t i T ij j i N j T ij Nt i - Î - È ¹ ´ - È \[( ,, )( ) ] , where
   T ij TT i T i T j T j T h - =´´ - ´ + ´´- ´+ ´´ ,1 1 1 1 1 LLL .
Moreover, given [A-3], since m- È ¹ ´ - È= ij j i N j T ij Nt i (( ,, ) ( )) 0,
qij j i N j T ij Nt i t i (( ,, )( ) | ) È ¹´ - È= 0 .
(b) Since  vi ti t i jx ndjx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,) (( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ³ ò ò j 0  for all n, and 
since jj n t i t i t i t i (, ) ˆ (, ) - Þ - for t i T ij j i N j T ij Nt i - Î - È ¹ ´ - È \[( ,, )( ) ] , it 15
follows from observation (a), the continuity of Vi t (, ) ×  on PI X () ´  for each i and 
t, and the Dominated Convergence Theorem (see Ash (1972)) that
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
-- ò ò j
= - ´ -
-- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j
= - ´ -
-- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j
³ 0 .
Thus, by observations (a) and (b), j() ×Î G .
In order to show that j() ×Î B , we will show that for each i and ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \
vi ti t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò v i t i t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j
for all  ¢ ti in Ti. (10)
There are two cases to consider.
Case 1:  m- ¢ > i Ni ti ( ( )) 0.
Under case 1, jj j (, ) (, ) ( ) ¢-=¢ × ¢-=¢ Î´ t i t i ht it i PI X for all t i T i - Î -  (recall that
ht it i (, ) ¢-= 1  in this case -- see (7) and (8) above). Thus, on the RHS of (10) we have
vi ti t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
¢-- ò ò j
=  vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x q i t i t i ( , , , ) ( ( , )) ( | ) - ´ -
¢ - £ ò ò j 0,
and since ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \ , by observation (b), we have on the LHS of (10)
vi ti t i jx djx
IX Ti
t i tiq i dt i ti (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ³ ò ò j 0 .
Thus, (10) holds for case 1.
Case 2:  m- ¢ = i Ni ti ( ( )) 0.16
Under case 2, jj (, ) ˆ (, ) ¢- = ¢- t i ti t i ti  for all t i T ij j i N j T ij Nt i - Î - È ¹ ´ - È ¢ \[( ,, )( ) ] , and
since m- È ¹ ´ - È ¢ = ij j i N j T ij Nt i (( ,, ) ( )) 0, qij j i N j T ij Nt i t i (( ,, )( ) | ) È ¹´ - È ¢ = 0 .
Also, since jj n t i t i t i t i (, ) ˆ (, ) ¢- Þ ¢- for all t i T ij j i N j T ij Nt i - Î - È ¹ ´ - È ¢ \[( ,, )( ) ] , it
follows from the continuity of Vi t (, ) ×  on PI X () ´  for each i and t, and the Dominated
Convergence Theorem that
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò j
= - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j
= - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j .
By observations (a) and (b), since ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \ ,
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
-- ò ò j
= - ´ -
-- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j
= - ´ -
-- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j .
Finally, since for all n, jn B () ×Î,
v i t i ti j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i (, , ,) (( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i (, , ,) (( ,) |, ) ( | ) j ,
for all n. Taking limits on both sides of the inequality above,
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,)(( ,) |, ) ( | ) j .
Thus, (10) holds for case 2.  Q.E.D.
Remarks 317
The mechanism, j() ×, defined in (8) above imposes a penalty,  ¢ Î´ j PI X () , on all the
buyers if any one buyer tells a mathematically inconvenient lie concerning his type.
Assumption [A-5] guarantees that such a penalty is available, and assumptions [A-3] (2)
and (3) (i.e., the assumptions concerning the dominating measure m) guarantee that these
mathematically inconvenient lies can be detected under the conditions of incomplete
information prevailing in the auction.
Proof of 5.3
Let
U B utjx djx tp
IX T
dt = ××ÎÇ ´ ò ò sup (|) ( , ,)(( ,) |) ( ) j j G 0 .
Since the seller's payoff function, u( , , ) ×××, is p0-integrably bounded, U is finite. Let
{( ) } j nn B ×Ì Ç G  be a sequence of auction mechanisms such that
utjx ndjx tp
IX T
dt U ( , ,) (( ,) |) ( ) j 0 ´
® ò ò .
Since BÇG is K-compact [m], we can assume without loss of generality that {( ) } j nn ×
K-converges to a K-limit j() ×ÎÇ B G , and since p0 <<  m, we can conclude that














dt U ( , ,) (( ,) |) ( ) j 0 ´










U ( , ,) (( ,) |) ( ) j
´
=
® ò ò å .
Thus,  utjx ndjx tp
IX T
dt U ( , ,) (( ,) |) ( ) j 0 ´
® ò ò .
For each tT Î  and jÎ ´ PI X () , let
Ut utjx djx
IX
(, ) (,, ) ( (, ) ) jj =
´ ò . (11)18
By Lemma 1.5 of Nowak (1984), Ut (, ) ×  is upper semicontinuous on PI X () ´  with
respect to the (metrizable) topology of weak convergence of measures for each t, and by
Lemma 1.6 of Nowak, U( , ) ×× is S´ ´ BPI X (( ) ) -measurable (see also chapter III in
Dellacherie and Meyer (1975)). Thus, for any mechanism j() (,( ) ) ×Î ´ MTPI X , the
function tU t t ® (, () ) j  is S-measurable, where
Ut t utjx djx
IX
t (, () ) (,, ) ( (, ) |) jj =
´ ò . (12)
Next,  jj n () () ×Þ × a.e. [p0] implies via the upper semicontinuity of Ut (, ) ×  on
PI X () ´  that limsup ( , ( )) ( , ( )) n Ut ntU t t jj £  a.e. [p0]. Since the seller's payoff
function, u( , , ) ×××, is p0-integrably bounded from above, it follows from Fatou's Lemma
(see Ash (1972)) that
limsup ( , ( )) ( ) limsup ( , ( )) ( ) n Ut nt
T
pd t n Ut nt
T
pd t jj òò £ 00 .
Thus,
limsup ( , ( )) ( ) ( , ( )) ( ) n Ut nt
T
pd t U U t t
T
pd t jj òò =£ 00 ,
and since j() ×ÎÇ B G ,
Ut t
T
pd t u t j x d j xt p
IX T
dt U (, () ) ( ) (,, ) ( (, )| ) ( ) jj òò ò =
´
= 00 . Q.E.D.
Remarks 4
(1) The seller will hold the auction if and only if it is rational for him to do so. This can
be formally expressed as follows. Suppose j() ×Î Ç B G  solves the seller's auction design
problem given in expression (3) above. Then the seller will hold the auction if and only if
the optimal mechanism j() × is such that,
utjx djx tp
IX T
dt ( , ,)(( ,) |) ( ) j 0 0
´
³ ò ò .19
(2) In the introduction we stated that ... not all the mechanisms contained in the
equivalence class determined by the K-limit of a K-convergent sequence of rational, BIC
auction mechanisms are BIC. In order to see why this is the case, consider the following:
Let {( ) } j nn B ×Ì Ç G  be any sequence of mechanisms. Since MTPI X (,( ) ) ´  is K-
compact [m], we can assume without loss of generality that {( ) } j nn ×  K-converges to a K-
limit  ˆ() (,( ) ) j×Î ´ MTPI X . Thus, for some m-null set N ÎS,  jj n tt () ˆ () Þ  for all









×+ + × 1 L
.
As in the proof of Theorem 5.1, let
Nt i t i Ti t it i N (){ : (, ) } =-Î-- Î . 
For each i, we have
mmm () (() ) ( ) N i T i
Nt ii dti = - = ò 0, 
so that for some Nii ÎS  with mi Ni () = 0 ,
m - = i Nt i ( ( )) 0 for all ti Ti Ni Î \ . 
Since for each i, mm m i N ii T i N i T i () ( ) ( ) × -- =´ - = 0  and pii i << = ´ - mm m,
p i N iT i () ´ - = 0 , for each i = 0,1,2,...,h.
Now let Cin Qin i ÈÎ S  denote the subset of ith buyer types (i = 1,2,...,h) such
that  pi Cin Qin T i (( ) ) È´ - = 0  and such that for ith buyer types ti Cin Qin ÎÈ
rationality and/or incentive compatibility may fail to hold under the mechanism jn() × (see
(1) and (2)), and let
Fin C in Qin Ni ¥ =È È È [( ) ] , 
where the sets Ni are given via (5) and (6). Since pi Fi T i () ¥ ´ - = 0 ,20
pii F i T i (( ) ) È ¥ ´ -= 0 .
In determining whether or not the K-limit ˆ() j× is Bayesian incentive compatible, a
problem arises if for the ith buyer with true type ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \ , there is a type,  ¢ ti in Ti, that
the ith buyer can report such that qi Ni ti ti (( ) | ) ¢ > 0 . To see why there is a problem
consider the following:
Since {( ) } j n
nB ×Ì Ç G , we have for each n,
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i (, , ,) (( ,) |, ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i (, , ,) (( ,) |, ) ( | ) j .
(*)
Moreover, since ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \  taking the limit on the left hand side (LHS) of (*) we obtain
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
-- ò ò j
= - ´ -
-- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j .
However, because  qi Ni ti ti (( ) | ) ¢ > 0  and because K-convergence may fail to hold for
types t i -  in Ni ti T i () ¢Ì- , the limit on the RHS of (*),
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò j ,
may not equal
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò j .
Thus, we cannot conclude that
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j ,21
and thus we cannot conclude that the K-limit mechanism ˆ() j× is Bayesian incentive
compatible. Note that if  qi Ni ti ti (( ) | ) ¢ = 0 , there is no problem - we have
lim ( , , , ) ( ( , )| , ) ( | ) n vi ti t i j
IX Ti
x ndjx t it iq it i t i - ´ -
¢ -- ò ò j
= - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j .
Thus, taking limits on both sides of (*), we obtain
vi ti t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) - ´ -
-- ò ò j
³ - ´ -
¢ -- ò òv i t i t i j
IX Ti
xd j x t i t i q i t i t i (, , ,) ˆ (( ,) | , ) ( | ) j ,
and we can easily conclude that  ˆ() j× is Bayesian incentive compatible.
Note that if we use the K-limit mechanism  ˆ() j× and the penalty measure  ¢ j  to
construct a new mechanism j() × given by
jj j () ˆ ()( () ) () t t ht ht =× - + ¢ × 1
where
ht
if for some i i Nt i
otherwise
()
,( ( ) ) ,
,






(as we did in the proof of Theorem 5.1) then the resulting mechanism is contained in the
m-equivalence class determined by the K-limit  ˆ() j× and is rational and Bayesian incentive
compatible. Thus, by constructing the mechanism j() × we avoid altogether the problem
caused by the possibility that for some buyer i with true type ti Ti Fi Î ¥ \  there is a type  ¢ ti
such that qi Ni ti ti (( ) | ) ¢ > 0 .
(3) The auction model and the existence result presented here can easily be extended to
other auction settings. For example, by replacing XR h Ì  with a compact metric space of
state-contingent contracts, we can conclude from our existence result that there exists an
optimal Bayesian mechanism for contract auctions with risk averse participants. We can22
also modify our model so as to treat auctions in which payoffs are awarded to coalitions.
Finally, we can use our model to extend to an incomplete information setting the basic
theory of all-pay auction (e.g., Baye, Kovenock, and De Vries (1993)).  23
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